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QUESTION PRESENTED ON REHEARING 
Did the Court overlook the issue of whether the Dishingers are the prevailing 
party on appeal for purposes of an award of attorney's fees incurred on appeal? 
ARGUMENT 
In the opening Brief of Appellants and in the Reply Brief of Appellants, the 
Dishingers specifically argued that this Court "should order the trial court to award 
the Dishingers their reasonable attorney^ fees at trial and on appeal." Br. of 
Appellants 19; Reply Br. of Appellants 17 (emphasis added). 
This Court has remanded this case to "the trial court to determine if either 
party is entitled to attorney fees as the 'prevailing party' under the lease." Dishinger 
v. Potter, 2001 UT App 209, 1 40 (copy of opinion attached as an addendum to this 
petition). The determination of who is the "prevailing party" at the trial court level 
in light of this Court's decision is appropriately made by the trial court. However, 
the determination of who is the "prevailing party" on appeal for purposes of an 
attorney's fee award is customarily made by the appellate court, and on remand the 
trial court is instructed to make a factual finding as to the appropriate amount of such 
attorney's fees. See, e.g., Russell v. Thomas, 2000 UT App 82, J 18, 999 P.2d 
1244 ("Because plaintiffs were the prevailing party on appeal, we remand to the trial 
court for a determination of reasonable costs and attorney fees."); Redevelopment 
Agency of Salt Lake City v. Daskalas, 785 P.2d 1112, 1126-27 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) 
-1-
("Owners are entitled to reimbursement by Tenants of their attorney fees incurred on 
appeal. We remand for purposes of determining the amount of a reasonable attorney 
fee."). This Court overlooked the latter principle in remanding the prevailing 
party/attorney fee question to the trial court. 
The Dishingers prevailed on the issues they appealed to this Court. 
The Court's holdings that there was an accord and satisfaction setting the 
appropriate rental rate at $19 per square foot, and that the Dishingers were 
not in unlawful detainer (Dishinger v. Potter, 2001 UT App 209, 1 40) gave 
the Dishingers essentially all the relief they sought on appeal (with the only 
other issue being attorney's fees). 
In contrast, Ms. Potter only prevailed on one narrow issue that she 
presented on appeal, namely that she was entitled to an unspecified amount of 
administrative fees.1 Ms. Potter did not prevail on her claim that the "then 
prevailing rental rate" was synonymous with "market rate" and that the 
1
 Ms. Potter's claim for administrative fees arose in the context of the 
Dishingers' claim for an accounting at trial. In order to justify the amount of common 
area charges that Ms. Potter had previously charged the Dishingers, she included 
administrative fees in her accounting for the very first time during the litigation (which 
administrative fees had not previously been charged to the Dishingers or other tenants 
with similar leases notwithstanding the language in the lease). Accordingly, Ms. 
Potter's claim for administrative fees will ultimately offset in part the $8,372.61 (plus 
a proportionate share of a property tax refund) which was awarded to the Dishingers at 
trial as the amount that Ms. Potter had overcharged the Dishingers for common area 
charges (R. 606). The amount of the claimed administrative fees applicable to the 
accounting period addressed at trial is $1,873.93. See Ms. Potter's Memorandum in 
Support of Defendant's Proposed Judgment, filed January 27, 1998, at p. 3 (R. 385). 
-2-
appropriate rental rate should be $30 per square foot. Ms. Potter did not 
prevail on her claim for late charges either. 
Accordingly, this Court should declare that the Dishingers are the 
prevailing party on appeal for purposes of an award of attorney's fees 
incurred on appeal. Alternatively, the Court should clarify in its instructions 
to the trial court on remand that it has the discretion to determine which party 
was the "prevailing party" at trial and on appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should amend its opinion to make clear that the Dishingers are the 
prevailing party on appeal for purposes of an award of attorney's fees incurred on 
appeal, the amount of which to be determined by the trial court on remand. 
I hereby certify that this petition is presented in good faith and not for delay. 
Dated this 11th day of July, 2001. 
Respectfully submitted, 
TESCH, VANCE & MILLER, LLC 
^^^^^wayn^/^Vance 
<s^ David^B: Thompson 
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This opinion is subject to revision before 
publication in the Pacific Reporter. 
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BILLINGS, Judge: 
fl plaintiffs James and Nancy Dishinger dba TCBY Yogurt (the 
Dishingers) appeal the trial court's judgment finding them in 
unlawful detainer. Defendant Jana Potter dba Silver Queen Hotel 
(Potter) cross-appeals the trial court's refusal to instruct the 
jury on the meaning of "prevailing rate" and its failure to award 
her administrative, late, and attorney fees. We reverse and 
remand. 
BACKGROUND 
^2 in May of 1990, Erik Ziskend entered into a commercial lease 
with Potter for premises located on Main Street in Park City, 
Utah. On May 31, 1994, Ziskend assigned the lease to the 
Dishingers. Potter consented to the assignment. The Dishingers 
operated a frozen yogurt shop on the premises. 
113 The lease provided for continuous three year options after 
expiration of the initial three year lease term. Under the terms 
of the lease, the Dishingers, as tenants, were required to notify 
Potter in writing of their desire to exercise the option 120 days 
prior to the expiration of the current lease term. The lease 
specified that the rental rate for an option period would be 
"adjusted upward, but not less than the current Minimum Monthly 
Rent being paid, to the then prevailing rental rate of similar 
buildings in the Main Street area of Park City, Utah."1 
H4 On February 1, 1996, the Dishingers notified Potter in 
writing of their desire to exercise the lease renewal option. 
Thereafter, the following correspondence took place. On April 4, 
1996, Potter advised the Dishingers that the prevailing rental 
rate of similar buildings on Main Street in Park City was $30 per 
square foot and thus, pursuant to the lease, $3 0 per square foot 
($2,425.00/month) would constitute the new base monthly rent. 
The Dishingers responded that, based on the appraisal they had 
performed, the prevailing rental rate of similar buildings was 
$19 per square foot ($1,535.83/month). 
H5 At the commencement of the July 1, 19 96 renewal period, 
without an agreement as to what would constitute the base monthly 
rent, the Dishingers began paying rent in an amount reflecting 
their appraisal of $19 per square foot. They sent Potter a check 
for $1,976.92, clearly noting it was for "New Base Rent." On 
July 8, 1996, Potter sent the Dishingers a notice of default on 
the grounds that the Dishingers were $889.17 delinquent in their 
July rental payment. On July 13, 19 96, Potter served the 
Dishingers with a notice to pay the remaining rent or quit. On 
July 15, 1996, Potter negotiated the Dishinger's July 1 rent 
check. On the first of every month, from July 1996 through June 
1997, the Dishingers sent Potter a check for $2,137.II2 
reflecting $19 per square foot in base monthly rent. Potter 
negotiated each of those checks. 
H6 On August 8, 1996, the Dishingers filed a declaratory 
judgment action asking the trial court to interpret the lease 
provision regarding the monthly rental rate. Potter counter-
claimed for breach of lease and unlawful detainer. 
1. From a review of the record it appears that the Dishingers 
were paying $18.48 per square foot in minimum monthly rent at the 
time they notified Potter of their desire to exercise the option. 
2. The Dishingers subtracted $160.19 from the July 1, 1996 
rental payment for remaining credits and premature Consumer Price 
Index increases occurring in 1994 and 1995. 
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1[7 After a jury trial, the jury returned a special verdict 
answering a number of factual questions. In the special verdict 
the jury found there was a legitimate dispute as to the "then 
prevailing rental rate," that the Dishingers tendered payment to 
Potter in full satisfaction of the disputed amount based on their 
appraisal of $19, and that Potter accepted the rent payments 
after the July 13 notice to quit. The jury also found the "then 
prevailing rental rate" to be $25 per square foot, and as such, 
Potter was entitled to recover the balance of base rent, totaling 
$8,730. 
f8 The Dishingers filed a motion for entry of judgment based on 
the special verdict, arguing that the jury's special verdict 
established an accord and satisfaction, which fixed the base 
rental rate at $19 per square foot, and thus, they were current 
in monthly payments and Potter's unlawful detainer claim should 
be dismissed. The Dishingers also argued that a determination 
that they were in unlawful detainer of the premises was precluded 
because Potter accepted rental payments after serving the notice 
to quit, thus waiving forfeiture of the lease. 
i|9 The trial court, first Judge Brian, then Judge Hilder in an 
amended judgment, entered judgment for Potter. The trial court 
concluded that, based on the findings of the jury in its special 
verdict, it was "clear" that while Potter accepted payments after 
the notice to quit, the amount received "did not represent a full 
payment of base rent," and thus did not constitute an accord and 
satisfaction. Thus, the trial court concluded the Dishingers 
were in unlawful detainer and entered judgment in favor of Potter 
for $8,730, which was trebled to $26,190 pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-36-10 (1996). This appeal followed. 
i[lO On appeal, the Dishingers argue the trial court was 
precluded from determining they were in unlawful detainer because 
the jury's special verdict established an accord and satisfaction 
as a matter of law. Alternatively, the Dishingers argue that 
Potter affirmed the lease by accepting rent payments, thereby 
waiving forfeiture of the lease, and thus precluding a finding of 
unlawful detainer. 
i|ll Potter cross-appeals, arguing the trial court should have 
instructed the jury that the "then prevailing rental rate" meant 
market rate. Potter also argues the trial court erred by failing 
to award her administrative fees, late fees, and attorney fees as 
required by the lease. 
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ANALYSIS 
I. Preliminary Issues 
J^l2 In addition to the claims raised in her cross-appeal, Potter 
asserts that the Dishingers failed to preserve their claims 
below, failed to provide a transcript of the proceedings and 
marshal the evidence, and cannot rely on the jury's special 
verdict because it was merely advisory. Before addressing the 
main substantive issues on appeal, we first address these 
threshold arguments. 
A. Preservation of Claims 
i]l3 Potter first argues the Dishingers failed to preserve their 
claim of accord and satisfaction in accordance with Rule 
24(a) (5) (A) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. Rule 
24(a)(5)(A) provides that "[t]he brief of the appellant shall 
contain . . . citation to the record showing that the issue was 
preserved in the trial court." Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(5)(A). The 
Dishingers reference several places in the record to show that 
the issue of accord and satisfaction was preserved in the trial 
court.3 Thus, Potter's argument that the Dishingers did not 
preserve the issue of accord and satisfaction is without merit.4 
3. The Dishinger's citations to the record reference the jury's 
special verdict; the Dishinger's motion for entry of judgment 
based on special verdict; the Dishinger's memorandum in support 
of motion for relief from judgment; and the Dishinger's 
supplemental memorandum in support of motion for relief from 
judgment. In all these instances the issue of accord and 
satisfaction was raised in the trial court. 
4. We note the issue of accord and satisfaction was not raised 
in the pleadings. However, Rule 15(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure provides that issues not raised in the pleadings may be 
tried by express or implied consent. See Utah R. Civ. P. 15(b). 
"If an issue is fully tried, a court may decide the issue and 
deem the pleadings amended even if the issue was not originally 
pleaded." Shinkoskey v. Shinkoskey, 2001 UT App 44,^6 n.2, 19 
P.3d 1005 (citing Fisher v. Fisher, 907 P.2d 1172, 1176 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1995) (citation omitted)). "Whether the pleadings may be 
deemed amended depends on whether the opposing party had a fair 
opportunity to [prepare and meet the issue]." Id. (citing Colman 
v. Colman, 743 P.2d 782, 785 (Utah Ct. App. 1987)). It must be 
evident from the record that the issue has been tried. See id. 
(citing Fisher, 907 P.2d at 1176) . 
A review of the record reveals that evidence regarding the 
(continued...) 
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B. Marshaling the Evidence 
1J14 Potter next argues the Dishingers needed to provide a 
transcript of the proceedings to allow meaningful review of the 
evidence, and have also failed to marshal the evidence. A 
transcript of the proceedings is not required because the 
Dishingers are relying on the jury's special verdict on appeal, 
not the evidence presented at trial. See, e.g., Pugh v. North 
Am. Warranty Servs. , Inc., 2000 UT App 121,111, 1 P.3d 570. 
Moreover, the marshaling requirement applies only when 
challenging findings of fact. See Moon v. Moon, 1999 UT App 
12,1(24, 973 P. 2d 431. Clearly, the Dishingers are not 
challenging findings of fact. Rather, they are challenging the 
trial court's application of the law to the jury's special 
verdict findings and thus the Dishingers do not have the burden 
of marshaling the evidence. 
C. Advisory Jury Verdict 
Kl5 Relying on Peirce v. Peirce, 2000 UT 7, 994 P.2d 193, Potter 
next argues that the jury's special verdict was merely advisory, 
and therefore the trial court was not bound by the jury's 
findings in the special verdict. Potter's reliance on Peirce is 
misplaced. In Peirce, the issue before the court was "whether 
the jury served in an advisory capacity or whether [the] case was 
tried by a jury as a matter of right." Id. at Ul2. However, the 
plaintiff in Peirce was seeking an equitable remedy. See id. 
"When a jury is used in an equity case, it acts in an advisory 
capacity," id. (quoting Romrell v. Zions First Nat'1 Bank, 611 
P.2d 392, 394 (Utah 1980) (quotation and citation omitted)), 
"'unless both parties have clearly consented to accept a jury 
verdict.'" Id. at ^13 (quoting Romrell, 611 P.2d at 394); see 
also Utah R. Civ. P. 39(c). Because the parties did not clearly 
consent to accept a jury verdict, and the record indicated that 
the trial court treated the jury as advisory, the court held that 
the jury served only in an advisory capacity and thus afforded no 
deference to its findings. See id. at Hl5. 
4. (...continued) 
existence of an accord and satisfaction was presented at trial, 
and the jury was instructed on and made findings of fact that 
would support an accord and satisfaction. Additionally, the 
Dishingers argued accord and satisfaction in their motion for 
entry of judgment based on special verdict, which Potter had the 
opportunity to rebut, and the trial court entered judgment 
finding there was no accord and satisfaction. Thus, because 
Potter had the opportunity to prepare and meet the issue, we 
conclude that the issue of an accord and satisfaction was tried 
by implication. 
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Ul6 In the instant case, we are not dealing with an action in 
equity. Both the Dishingers and Potter pursued legal claims, the 
Dishingers specifically demanded a jury trial on those claims, 
and at no time did the trial court inform the parties or the jury 
that the jury was merely advisory. Cf. Goldberg v. Jav Timmons & 
Assocs. , 896 P.2d 1241, 1244 (Utah Ct. App. 19.95) (stating, "if 
the trial court had intended . . . to use an advisory jury, it 
should have notified the parties before the trial began"). 
Where, as here, the case is tried to a jury as a matter of right, 
Rule 49(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure permits the trial 
court to "require a jury to return only a special verdict in the 
form of a special written finding upon each issue of fact." Utah 
R. Civ. P. 49(a). "The [trial] court then applies the law to the 
facts as found and renders a verdict." Brigham v. Moon Lake 
Elec. Ass'n, 24 Utah 2d 292, 298, 470 P.2d 393, 397 (1970) 
(Ellett, J., further opinion) (commenting on Rule 49(a)). 
Hl7 As Justice Ellett explained in Brigham: 
The special verdict was devised to relieve 
the jury of attempting to apply the law in a 
complicated case to the facts in arriving at 
a verdict. Instructions to the jury are thus 
simplified, and the jurors may, therefore, 
concentrate upon the functions which belong 
to them, viz., to find the facts in the case. 
Id. Thus, "[i]n [the] case of a special verdict, the jury only 
finds the facts, and the court applies the law thereto and 
renders the verdict." Id. This is what occurred in the instant 
case. The trial court instructed the jury: "[I]t is your 
exclusive duty to determine the facts in this case, and to 
consider and weigh the evidence for that purpose"; "You are the 
exclusive judges of the facts and the evidence." (Emphasis 
added.) The trial court then entered judgment, "Based upon the 
evidence and the special verdict." (Emphasis added.) Thus, the 
jury was not merely advisory. Rather, the jury found the facts 
as set forth in its special verdict and the trial court entered 
judgment applying the law to those facts. 
II. Accord and Satisfaction 
fl8 The Dishingers argue that an accord and satisfaction 
occurred prior to trial which set the rental rate at $19 per 
square foot thus precluding a finding of unlawful detainer. They 
claim the jury's special verdict answers require a legal 
determination of accord and satisfaction. Whether the special 
verdict established an accord and satisfaction is a question of 
law which we review for correctness without any deference to the 
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trial court. See ProMax Dev. Corp. v. Raile, 2000 UT 4,1(17, 998 
P.2d 254. 
A. Elements of Accord and Satisfaction 
1f 19 To establish an accord and satisfaction, three elements must 
be present: "(1) an unliquidated claim or a bona fide dispute 
over the amount due; (2) a payment offered as full settlement of 
the entire dispute; and (3) an acceptance of the payment as full 
settlement of the dispute." Id. at ^20 (citing Marton Remodeling 
v. Jensen, 706 P.2d 607, 609-10 (Utah 1985)). 
1. Bona Fide Dispute Over Amount Due 
if20 To satisfy the first element, "There must be a good-faith 
disagreement over the amount due under the contract. The disagreement 
need not be well-founded, so long as it is in good faith." Estate 
Landscape & Snow Removal Specialists, Inc. v. Mountain States Tel. & 
Tel. Co., 844 P.2d 322, 326 (Utah 1992) (citing Golden Key Realty, 
Inc. v. Mantas, 699 P.2d 730, 733 (Utah 1985); Ashton v. Skeen, 85 
Utah 489, 496, 39 P.2d 1073, 1076 (1935)). The jury clearly found 
that there was a good faith disagreement over the amount due under 
the lease.5 The jury was asked: 
5. Although neither party has addressed this issue in their 
briefs, we note at the outset that the option provision in the 
lease is most likely unenforceable in Utah. It is a well-
recognized principle that, "A condition precedent to the 
enforcement of any contract is that there be a meeting of the 
minds of the parties, which must be spelled out, either expressly 
or implicitly, with sufficient definiteness to be enforced." 
Pinaree v. Continental Group of Utah, Inc., 558 P.2d 1317, 1321 
(Utah 1976) (emphasis added) (citation omitted) . In Pincrree, the 
Utah Supreme Court stated, 
"a provision for the extension or renewal of 
a lease must specify the time the lease is to 
extend and the rate to be paid with such a 
degree of certainty and definiteness that 
nothing is left to future determination. If 
it falls short of this requirement, it is not 
enforceable." 
Id. at 1321 (quoting Slayter v. Pasley, 264 P.2d 444, 446 (Or. 
1953) ) . 
In the instant case, the lease provided that the rental rate 
for the renewal period would be "the then prevailing rental rate 
of similar buildings in the Main Street area of Park City." On 
July 1, 1996, the commencement of the renewal period, the parties 
had yet to agree on what constituted "the then prevailing rental 
(continued...) 
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Considering all of the evidence in this case, 
do you find by a preponderance of the 
evidence that a legitimate dispute existed as 
to the "then prevailing rental rate of 
similar buildings in the Main Street area of 
Park City" at the time the [Dishingers] made 
monthly rental payments based on $19 per 
square foot as satisfaction in full? 
To this question the jury answered, "Yes." Thus, the first 
element of accord and satisfaction was established by the jury's 
special verdict. 
2. Payment Tendered in Full Satisfaction of Dispute 
U21 The jury found that the payments tendered by the Dishingers 
were made in full satisfaction of the disputed rent. The jury 
was asked: "Considering all the evidence in this case, do you 
find by a preponderance of the evidence that the [Dishingers] 
notified [Potter] that these payments were made in full 
satisfaction of the disputed rent amount?" The jury answered, 
"Yes." Thus, the second element of accord and satisfaction was 
established by the jury's special verdict. 
3. Acceptance of Payment as Full Settlement of Dispute 
H22 In Estate Landscape, the Utah Supreme Court reasoned that 
the third element of accord and satisfaction may be satisfied by 
the creditor's subjective intent to discharge an obligation by 
assenting to the accord, or conduct which gives rise to a 
reasonable inference that acceptance of payment discharged the 
obligation. See Estate Landscape, 844 P.2d at 330. 
1J23 In the instant case, the jury found that Potter accepted the 
monthly payments made by the Dishingers. The jury was asked: 
5. (...continued) 
rate of similar buildings in the Main Street area of Park City." 
Both parties had communicated to the other a vastly different 
rate and interpretation, and the Dishingers filed a declaratory 
judgment action asking the trial court to interpret the 
provision. Thus, it cannot be said that the rate provided for in 
the option provision of the lease possesses the certainty and 
definiteness required to be enforced. In sum, there was no 
meeting of the minds, and as a result, no agreement. Therefore, 
the lease terminated by its own terms as of July 1, 1996. 
However, because we conclude that an accord and satisfaction 
occurred, the unenforceability of the option provision does not 
affect our analysis. 
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"Considering all of the evidence in this case, do you find by a 
preponderance of the evidence that [Potter] accepted the monthly 
rent payments made by the [Dishingers] which are calculated at a 
rate of $19 per square foot?" The jury answered, "Yes." 
However, the jury did not make a finding that Potter subjectively 
intended to assent to the accord. The fact that Potter counter-
claimed for breach of the lease and unlawful detainer shows she 
did not subjectively intend to assent to the accord. Thus, to 
find an accord and satisfaction, we must determine whether 
Potter's conduct established the accord and satisfaction as a 
matter of law. 
H24 In Estate Landscape, the defendant sent the plaintiff a 
check for $8,613, and followed it with a letter stating that the 
check was "payment in full for satisfaction of contracted 
services. If you are not willing to accept that sum, . . . in 
full satisfaction of the sums due, DO NOT negotiate the check, 
for upon your negotiation of that check, we will treat the matter 
as fully paid." Id. at 324-25 (emphasis omitted). The plaintiff 
filed suit to recover the $30,162.50 it thought it was owed by 
the defendant, then negotiated the $8,613 check, and amended its 
complaint to recover the difference. See id. at 325. 
1125 The trial court ruled that negotiation of the check did not 
constitute an accord and satisfaction. See id. This court 
affirmed, over Judge Jackson's dissent, reasoning that the 
defendant's letter was "entirely unilateral," and that the 
plaintiff's 
signature on the check is not an assent to an 
accord not found on the face of the check as 
a restrictive endorsement, where the party to 
whom the accord is offered has expressly 
rejected the proposed accord, continued the 
dispute, and filed litigation to resolve it 
adversarially in court. 
Estate Landscape & Snow Removal Specialists, Inc. v. Mountain 
States Tel. & Tel. Co., 793 P.2d 415, 419-20 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) 
(footnote omitted), rev'd, 844 P.2d 322 (Utah 1992). 
1|26 The Utah Supreme Court disagreed and reversed, holding, 
"Where, as here, the check is tendered under the condition that 
negotiation will constitute full settlement, mere negotiation of 
the check constitutes the accord, regardless of the payee's 
efforts or intent to negate the condition." Estate Landscape, 
844 P.2d at 33 0. Thus, "'[w]hat is said is overridden by what is 
done, and assent is imputed as an inference of law.'" Id. 
(quoting Hudson v. Yonkers Fruit Co., 258 N.Y. 168, 179 N.E. 373, 
374 (1932)); see also Marton Remodeling v. Jensen, 706 P.2d 607, 
20000081-CA 9 
609 (Utah 1985) (holding negotiation of check with restrictive 
condition is an accord and satisfaction even though creditor 
wrote "not full payment" beneath condition prior to negotiation); 
Cove View Excavating & Constr. Co. v. Flynn, 758 P.2d 474, 478 
(Utah Ct. App. 1988) (finding an accord and satisfaction even 
though creditor crossed out restrictive condition on check before 
negotiation). 
1127 In the instant case, the Dishinger's first check noted the 
amount thereof was for "New Base Rent." Therefore, because 
Potter negotiated the check, which was tendered by the Dishingers 
in full satisfaction of the disputed amount of the base monthly 
rent, the fact that Potter at the same time brought an action for 
breach of lease and unlawful detainer is of no legal 
consequence.6 The third and final element of accord and 
satisfaction was established by Potter's conduct. 
B. Special Verdict 
f2 8 In its special verdict, the jury found: (1) "that a 
legitimate dispute existed as to the 'then prevailing rental rate 
of similar buildings in the Main Street area of Park City' at the 
time the [Dishingers] made monthly rental payments based on $19 
per square foot as satisfaction in full;" (2) the Dishingers 
"notified [Potter] that [the] payments were made in full 
satisfaction of the disputed amount;" and (3) Potter "accepted 
the monthly rent payments made by the [Dishingers] . . . at a 
rate of $19 per square foot." 
[^29 However, the jury also found that the prevailing rental rate 
was $25 per square foot, and that Potter was entitled to recover 
the "balance of base rent" from the Dishingers, totaling $8,730. 
Based on these findings, the trial court entered judgment for 
Potter, concluding that no accord and satisfaction existed and 
that the Dishingers were in unlawful detainer because the amount 
Potter received and accepted each month was less than what the 
jury subsequently determined to be the rental rate. 
6. In response, Potter attempts to rely on language from Tates, 
Inc. v. Little America Refining Co., 535 P.2d 1228 (Utah 1975), 
wherein our supreme court stated, "Ordinarily, the payment of 
part of a debt does not discharge it . . . . The reason for this 
is that in making the part payment, the debtor is doing nothing 
more than he is legally obligated to do." IdL. at 1229. This 
general statement is true, to the extent that there is no 
"dispute or uncertainty as to the amount due." Id. at 1229-30. 
In the instant case it is well established that there is a 
dispute as to the amount due. 
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1[3 0 Although it could be argued that the special verdict 
supports inconsistent legal theories (accord and satisfaction and 
unlawful detainer), the inconsistency is not fatal. The jury was 
instructed to answer all factual questions on all legal theories 
presented in the special verdict. While the jury's findings 
support inconsistent legal claims, a court is not precluded, 
under Rule 49(a), from applying the law to those findings and 
entering judgment for a party on one theory, as a matter of law, 
which precludes judgment on another inconsistent legal theory. 
See Milligan v. Capitol Furniture Co., 8 Utah 2d 383, 387, 335 
P.2d 619, 622 (1959) (holding inconsistent special verdict 
answers immaterial under Utah R. Civ. P. 49(a)); see also Tsudek 
v. Target Stores, Inc., 414 N.W.2d 466, 469-70 (Minn. Ct. App. 
1987) (finding inconsistent special verdict answers reconcilable 
where jury was simply answering all questions submitted based on 
the evidence). Thus, as was the case here, if the special 
verdict findings support, as a matter of law, an accord and 
satisfaction then there cannot be an unlawful detainer. 
C. Effect of Lease Provision 
1]31 Potter responds that even if the jury's special verdict 
findings support an accord and satisfaction, the lease itself 
precludes an accord and satisfaction. Potter relies on the 
"Waiver" provision of the lease which states: 
The waiver by Landlord of any term, covenant 
or condition herein contained shall not be 
deemed to be a waiver of such terms, covenant 
or condition or any subsequent breach of the 
same or any other term, covenant or condition 
herein contained. The subsequent acceptance 
of rent hereunder by Landlord shall not be 
deemed to be a waiver of any preceding 
default by Tenant of any term, covenant or 
condition of this Lease, other than the 
failure of Tenant to pay particular rent also 
accepted, regardless of Landlord's knowledge 
of such preceding default at the time of the 
acceptance of such rent. 
(Emphasis added.) Potter asserts that under this lease 
provision, "acceptance of partial rent could not constitute an 
accord and satisfaction." 
1(32 Though not perfectly drafted, the boilerplate language of 
this "Waiver" provision is not ambiguous. The relevant portion, 
emphasized above, provides that if the Dishingers default on any 
term, covenant, or condition of the lease, and thereafter tender 
a rental payment to Potter, and Potter accepts, by accepting, 
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Potter has not waived the prior defaults. For example, if the 
Dishingers install exterior lighting as prohibited by the lease, 
the installation, if not cured within thirty days of notice, is a 
default. If, thereafter, the Dishingers send Potter a rent check 
which Potter accepts, Potter has not waived the Dishinger's 
default for the installation. However, if the Dishinger's 
default for failure to pay rent, and thereafter tender a rental 
payment to Potter, which Potter accepts, Potter thereby waives 
the Dishinger's default for failure to pay rent. 
f33 What the lease provision does not provide, is that 
acceptance of partial rent does not constitute an accord and 
satisfaction. In fact, the term "accord and satisfaction" is 
conspicuously absent from the face of the lease, and beyond the 
"Waiver" provision, Potter fails to point to any language in the 
lease that would support her strained construction. Additionally, 
and perhaps more importantly, Potter cannot claim that the 
initial check tendered by the Dishingers was "partial rent," when 
there was never an agreement as to what would actually be the 
rental rate. While hindsight suggests that Potter should have 
provided for such a situation in the lease, we cannot write such 
a provision into the lease for her. See Jones v. ERA Brokers 
Consol. , 2000 UT 61,^|l8, 6 P.3d 1129; see also Rio Alaom Corp. v. 
Jimco Ltd., 618 P.2d 497, 505 (Utah 1980); Provo City Corp. v. 
Nielsen Scott Co., 603 P.2d 803, 806 (Utah 1979). Thus, Potter's 
argument that the lease prohibits an accord and satisfaction is 
not supported by the lease itself. 
1134 In sum, the jury's special verdict established as a matter 
of law an accord and satisfaction. The trial court erred in not 
entering a judgment on the rental rate for the option period in 
favor of the Dishingers. We therefore reverse the trial court's 
judgment of unlawful detainer and remand for the entry of a 
judgment for the Dishingers based on the legal theory of accord 
and satisfaction setting the rental rate at $19 per square foot.7 
III. Administrative, Late, and Attorney Fees 
1f35 Potter argues that the lease provides that the Dishingers 
shall pay administrative, late, and attorney fees. Potter 
submitted her claims for administrative and late fees to the 
jury. In its special verdict, the jury found that, in addition 
to what the Dishingers had already paid to Potter, Potter was 
7. Because we conclude there was an accord and satisfaction and 
thereby reverse the trial court's legal conclusion that the 
Dishingers were in unlawful detainer, we do not address the 
Dishinger's alternative argument of waiver and Potter's cross-
appeal regarding the definition of the term "prevailing rate." 
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only entitled to the "Balance of base rent." Based on this 
finding, the trial court determined that Potter was not entitled 
to administrative and late fees. However, this was properly a 
legal not a factual determination. The lease is clear and 
unambiguous that Potter was entitled to administrative fees. The 
lease states in no uncertain terms that the tenant shall pay for 
all costs and fees associated with supervising and administering 
to the common areas.8 
^36 The Dishingers respond that Potter's argument for 
administrative fees was not presented below. However, the trial 
court clearly ruled on the issue based on the jury's special 
verdict findings. Thus, Potter's claim for administrative fees 
was presented below. Therefore, we reverse and remand to the' 
trial court for an award of Potter's administrative fees. 
1137 The lease further provides: 
Tenant shall pay to Landlord a late charge of 
ten ($10.00) dollars per day until the amount 
due is paid in full. Tenant further agrees 
to pay any attorney's fees [sic] incurred by 
Landlord by reason of Tenant's failure to pay 
rent and/or other charges when due hereunder. 
(Emphasis added.) Thus, Potter was only entitled to late fees 
and attorney fees under this provision if the Dishingers failed 
to pay rent. Because we conclude there was an accord and 
satisfaction, the Dishingers were current on their rent payments 
and therefore Potter was not entitled to late fees.9 
1(38 The trial court determined that Potter was not entitled to 
attorney fees because the lease provided that the "prevailing 
party shall be entitled to recover" its attorney fees, and while 
Potter prevailed on her counter-claim, the Dishingers prevailed 
8. Specifically, the lease states that the tenant shall pay 
All costs to supervise and administer said 
common areas, used in common by the tenants 
or occupants of the building. [S]aid costs 
shall include such fees as may be paid to a 
third party in connection with same and shall 
in any event include a fee to Landlord to 
supervise and administer same in an amount 
equal to ten (10%) of the total costs of (i) 
above. 
9. Potter does not argue she was entitled to attorney fees under 
this provision. 
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on their claims for an accounting and credit for overcharges of 
common area expenses. Thus, the trial court determined neither 
party should be awarded attorney fees because both prevailed. 
113 9 Because we conclude that there was an accord and 
satisfaction and thus no unlawful detainer, the "prevailing 
party" issue as to attorney fees should be reconsidered by the 
trial court on remand. Therefore, pursuant to the terms of the 
lease, Potter is entitled to her administrative fees, and we 
remand to have the trial court determine if either party should 
be awarded attorney fees as the "prevailing party" under the 
lease. 
CONCLUSION 
1(40 We conclude, based on the jury's special verdict, an accord 
and satisfaction occurred as a matter of law fixing the "then 
prevailing rental rate" for the option period of the lease at $19 
per square foot in base monthly rent. Therefore, because the 
Dishingers were in lawful possession of the premises, we reverse 
the trial court's legal determination of unlawful detainer and 
its award of treble damages. We further conclude that under the 
terms of the lease, Potter was entitled to her administrative 
fees and remand for the trial court to determine if either party 
is entitled to attorney fees as the "prevailing party" under the 
lease. 
^Judith M. Billings, Judge 
H41 I CONCUR: 
rne, JrTT^kid WilTi^mS? AafThorne73T ^^u ge 
ORME, Judge (dissenting): 
[^42 I cannot agree there was an accord and satisfaction in this 
case. While there was a bona fide dispute over the new rental 
rate and the Dishingers may well have tendered their payments 
with the thought it was in full satisfaction of what was due, 
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there is no finding that Potter accepted the payments in full 
satisfaction nor any basis in the evidence to conclude that she 
did so. On the contrary, the Dishingers and Potter had exchanged 
letters indicating very different views of what constituted the 
"then prevailing rental rate." Nothing suggests either side 
thereafter acceded to the view of the other or that they reached 
a compromise. On the contrary, within days of accepting the 
Dishingers1 check, Potter sent the Dishingers a default notice 
stating what she believed the shortfall to be. A couple of weeks 
later, the Dishingers filed their declaratory judgment action 
acknowledging there was a dispute between the parties and asking 
the court to resolve it--not claiming there had been a dispute 
between the parties that had been resolved by accord and 
satisfaction and asking the court to enforce the accord. 
%43 Applicable law does not require anything inconsistent with 
the expectations of the parties, as shown by their conduct. The 
"New Base Rent" notation, apparently made in the "For " 
space on the front of the check, clearly does not satisfy the 
UCC's requirement that "the instrument or an accompanying written 
communication contain [] a conspicuous statement to the effect 
that the instrument was tendered as full satisfaction of the 
claim." Utah Code Ann. § 70A-3-31M2) (1997) (emphasis added). 
In addition, cases relied on by the majority are inapposite. In 
both Marton Remodeling v. Jensen, 706 P.2d 607 (Utah 1985), and 
Cove View Excavating & Construction Co. v. Flynn, 758 P.2d 474 
(Utah Ct. App. 1988), unlike in this case, the checks evidencing 
the accord and satisfaction contained actual restrictive 
endorsement provisions. See Marton Remodeling, 706 P.2d at 608 
("Endorsement hereof constitutes full and final satisfaction of 
any and all claims . . . . " ) ; Cove View, 758 P.2d at 476 (check 
contained "pmt. in full" language on front of check and this 
restrictive endorsement language on back of check: "payment in 
full for all labor and materials to 6/26/84"). In Estate 
Landscape & Snow Removal Specialists, Inc. v. Mountain States 
Telephone & Telegraph Co., 844 P.2d 322 (Utah 1992), a detailed 
letter made it clear that the check could be accepted only as 
full payment. See id. at 324-25. 
1J44 As a matter of law, the facts in this case do not establish 
an accord and satisfaction. The jury recognized this and went on 
to find that the prevailing rental rate was $25 per square foot 
and that the Dishingers owed this to Potter under their contract. 
Does this mean the Dishingers unlawfully detained the premises, 
subjecting them to treble damages? It does not. Potter, in her 
"notice to pay rent or quit," demanded payment of a sum well in 
excess of what she was entitled to contractually. The jury found 
the prevailing rate was $25, but she had demanded payment of $30. 
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The invalid demand renders the notice completely ineffective to 
place the Dishingers in a state of unlawful detainer. 
1|45 When the dust settles in this case, the proper result 
emerges with reasonable clarity. The Dishingers did not owe as 
much as Potter thought they did, but they owed more than they 
thought they did. There was no accord and satisfaction, so they 
are liable for the shortage. On the other hand, Potter had no 
right to demand payment of an amount to which she was not 
entitled, so she may not have the lesser amount to which she was 
actually entitled trebled, nor is she entitled to any other 
relief specially available under the unlawful detainer statute. 
Clearly, then, there is no prevailing party here--each side won a 
little and lost a little--so neither side is entitled to an award 
of attorney fees. 
1|46 On remand, I would simply have the trial court amend its 
judgment to reflect the foregoing. 
Orme, Judge 
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